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Case No. 20010225-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from a conditional no contest plea to one count of criminal 
solicitation, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §76-4-203 (1999). 
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the prosecution present sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing to 
support a reasonable belief that defendant committed criminal solicitation? 
"The determination of whether to bind a criminal defendant over for trial is a 
question of law" reviewed without deference to the trial court. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 
TI 8, 20 P.3d 300. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are contained in Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-203, 76-4-204 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State originally charged defendant with one alternative count of solicitation to 
commit aggravated murder, a first degree felony, or solicitation to commit aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony. R. 9-10. At the preliminary hearing the State submitted an 
amended information adding a second count of witness tampering, a third degree felony. 
R. 35-36; 194: 4-5. 
Following the preliminary hearing, defendant moved the magistrate to dismiss both 
charges and requested leave to file a memorandum setting forth the arguments in support 
of his motion. R. 194: 60-61.1 In a memorandum decision the magistrate denied 
defendant's motion to dismiss and bound the matter over for trial. R. 87-92. 
Defendant did not file a motion to quash the bindover, nor did he proceed to trial. 
Rather, he entered into a conditional plea agreement in which he agreed to plead no 
contest to the second alternative charge of count one - criminal solicitation, a third degree 
felony. R. 152-53, 155-60, 192: 2-13. The State agreed to dismiss the first alternative 
charge, as well as count two, and also agreed that defendant could "challenge the 
1
 The defendant's memoranda are contained in the record at R. 37-48, regarding 
count one, and R. 49-51, regarding count two. The State's response is included in the 
record at R. 71-86. Both the State and defendant also submitted amended memoranda on 
the motion to dismiss. R. 94-111 - defendant's memorandum; R. 112-117 - State's 
memorandum. 
2 
sufficiency of the evidence in this case" on appeal. R. 155-60, 192: 2-13. The trial court 
sentenced defendant to zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison. R. 173-75. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
"He wanted the bitch killed, " 
Defendant was enraged with his ex-wife because he believed she had cheated on 
him, had not allowed him to see his children, and had falsely accused him of several 
crimes when he sought to see his children, resulting in his incarceration. R. 193: 42:32 -
45:00.3 Defendant also believed that his ex-wife socialized with and allowed his children 
to be tended by "fagots and lesbians." Id. 
Motivated by his hatred for his ex-wife, defendant approached fellow Utah County 
Jail inmate Phillip Meza and asked to speak with him in the men's restroom. R. 194: 7. 
Meza and defendant became acquainted through their participation in the jail's work 
release program. R. 194: 6. As the two entered the bathroom defendant inquired whether 
Meza "was still connected." R. 194: 7. Meza looked around the bathroom to see if 
anyone else was there, and then asked defendant "why?" R. 194: 8. 
2
 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are recited in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution. See State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, f 3, 26 P.3d 223 ("At the preliminary 
hearing . . . 'the magistrate should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution.'") (quoting State v. 
Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998)). 
3
 R. 193 is a videotape of a controlled meeting between defendant and Phillip 
Meza at a motel. References indicate the number of minutes and seconds elapsed from 
the beginning of the video. The video itself does not contain its own time-code. 
3 
Defendant explained that "he had a problem that he needed to solve and wanted to 
know if [Meza] would be able to handle it." R. 194: 8. When Meza asked about the 
nature of defendant's problem, defendant explained that he wanted his ex-wife killed. Id. 
"Do you know what you actually just told me?" Meza exclaimed. Id. Defendant 
responded affirmatively, and added that "he wanted the bitch killed." Id. 
When Meza told defendant that he had someone who could "pick that up," 
defendant replied that he had $5,000 and could get information about his ex-wife's work 
and home addresses. R. 194: 8. Meza countered that it would cost defendant $10,000. 
Id. "No problem," defendant said. Id. 
Meza asked defendant why he wanted his ex-wife killed. R. 194: 9. Defendant 
explained that she was the reason he was incarcerated, that she had divorced him, cheated 
on him, and that "he basically wanted her taken care of." Id. Meza told defendant that if 
he was really serious, Meza "could contact [his] friend and have it done." Id. The two 
then talked about defendant's children and the location of defendant's ex-wife's 
employment. Id. They also agreed not to further discuss the matter inside the jail. Id. 
Finally, they confirmed that "the next time [they] talk[ed] would be to arrange the murder 
of [defendant's] [ex-]wife." Id. 
Defendant again approaches Meza 
Meza was released on work release the next morning. R. 194: 10. He attempted to 
contact the major crimes task force but only reached a recording. R. 194: 10-11. He also 
attempted to contact other law enforcement officers with whom he was acquainted, but 
4 
was unsuccessful. Id. Upon returning to the jail that evening, Meza spoke with Sargent 
Pietka and related the details of his conversation with defendant. R. 194: 11. After 
hearing Meza's story, Sargent Pietka called Detective Darren Durfey and escorted Meza 
to the detective's offices in the jail. Id. Meza repeated to Detective Durfey the details of 
his conversation with defendant. R. 194: 12. Detective Durfey instructed Meza to 
contact him if defendant approached him again. Id. 
Later that evening defendant again approached Meza at the jail and gave him a 
piece of paper upon which defendant had written his cellphone number. R. 194: 10, 12. 
Defendant had also written instructions for Meza to call him the next day to arrange a 
lunch meeting where they could discuss the situation. Id. 
The next morning Meza called Detective Durfey and informed him that defendant 
had given Meza a cellphone number. R. 194: 12. Meza then met with a detective in a 
conference room at the Fourth District Courthouse in Provo. R. 194: 13. They discussed 
setting up a controlled meeting at a motel between defendant and Meza. Id. Later that 
afternoon Meza called Detective Durfey, who instructed Meza to meet him at the Motel 6 
in Lehi. Id. After arriving at the motel, officers set up video and audio recording 
equipment in one of the rooms. Id. Meza then called defendant and arranged for 
defendant to meet him in that room. R. 194: 14. 
The motel meeting 
Once in the motel room, Meza asked defendant if he was serious about following 
through with his plans. R. 193: 06:03. Defendant responded affirmatively. Id. The two 
5 
then discussed the possibility of the meeting being a "set-up," with Meza explaining that 
he was nervous that it was defendant who was setting him up because defendant was a 
former deputy sheriff. R. 193: 06:20-06:50. Defendant assured Meza that he was not 
"setting him up," explaining that it was he who had approached Meza, that he had 
brought paper-work with him, and stating, 4Tm prepared to lay mine out. I'll show you 
mine if you show me yours." Id. Meza then told defendant, "If you're . . . serious, we'll 
get it done. My partner's ready." R. 193:07:13. 
"/can get $5,000 in cash upfront. " 
Defendant told Meza, "I'd do this myself, but I'm too close. I can't take the heat." 
R. 193: 08:00. Meza inquired about timing, asking whether defendant wanted "it" done 
tomorrow. R. 193: 10:15. Defendant responded that he did not want "it" done that fast 
because he needed time to come up with the money. R. 193: 10:15-10:38. Defendant 
explained that withdrawing thousands of dollars from his accounts near the time of his 
ex-wife's murder would raise suspicion. Id. He told Meza, "I want at least two weeks." 
Id. Defendant then explained that he would use cash, rather than checks, so that it would 
be more difficult to trace the transactions. Id. He also added that he trafficked in 
prescription pain killers and could use those as partial payment. R. 193: 10:48. 
Defendant emphasized that he did not want any recordable financial transactions. R. 193: 
11:42. 
6 
Defendant then set forth detailed payment arrangements. R. 193: 11:45-12:54. He 
explained, "I can get $5,000 in cash up front," which would be paid in two weeks. Id. 
Defendant would then provide the remaining $5,000 in sixty days. Id. 
"It should look like an accident " 
Defendant also emphasized that he wanted to set the time table for the attack on 
his ex-wife. R. 193: 13:05-13:19. He instructed Meza that "[w]hen I say go, he's ready 
to go. He's not moving or anything," referring to Meza's "connection." Id. Defendant 
also emphasized that he did not want his children to be with his ex-wife when the attack 
took place. Id. 
Defendant then suggested several methods for carrying out the attack stating, "it 
either looks like an accident... . She drove off a cliff, she got mugged and shot . . ." R. 
193: 12:25. Meza asked whether defendant was hoping to collect on his ex-wife's 
insurance policy and therefore wanted her body to be found. R. 193: 13:42. Defendant 
replied, "If they don't find her body, there's no insurance. That's why it should look like 
an accident." R. 193: 13:48. 
Defendant then inquired, "Is this guy a professional? Is he willing to put in the 
time?" R. 193: 14:00. Meza reassured defendant telling him that if he would provide his 
ex-wife's name, home and work addresses, work schedule, and a description of her 
vehicle, then his "contact" would immediately being working to track down defendant's 
ex-wife. R. 193: 14:00-14:40. Meza explained, however, that if his "contact" put in this 
type of effort, then "it's a go. You can't take this . . . back at all." Id. 
7 
Defendant commented that Meza was making him nervous by continually telling 
him that he could not "take this back." R. 193: 14:40-15:07. He explained that he had 
watched videotapes of similar controlled meetings. Id. He then questioned Meza about 
whether he had rented the room, and asked Meza to "stick his neck out for [him]." R. 
193:15:22-15:40. "What have you done that's unknown?" asked defendant Id. Meza 
then disclosed several crimes that he had allegedly committed while in prison. Id. 
Defendant left the room to retrieve some "case files" on alleged Mexican Mafia members 
whom he had investigated as a private investigator and with whom Meza may have been 
acquainted. R. 193: 16:55. Defendant then returned to the room where the two reviewed 
the files and discussed various names. R. 193: 20:30-24:35. 
"It can be as sloppy as it wants to be, as long as it looks like a bad robbery, " 
Meza then asked defendant for some information on his ex-wife, so he could begin 
conducting surveillance. R. 193: 25:45. Defendant explained that his ex-wife worked as 
a secretary for State Farm Insurance in Oremi. R. 193: 30:14-31:45. Meza asked 
defendant if he wanted his ex-wife to "just disappear." R. 193: 32:12. Defendant then 
explained, "[i]t can be as sloppy as it wants to be, as long as it looks like a bad robbery." 
R. 193: 32:15. When Meza asked if defendant wanted pictures, defendant replied "no." 
R. 193:32:26. Defendant quickly added, however, "[p]roof? Yes." R. 193: 32:33. 
Defendant also commented that he had been in Meza's position on two prior occasions 
when others had approached defendant and arranged to have someone killed. R. 193: 
33:01. Defendant offered that he could do a similar favor for Meza if he needed it. Id. 
8 
Defendant then told Meza that his ex-wife lived at 1000 East in Orem. R. 193: 
33:44. He also told Meza that her name was Jessica, although she went by Jake. R. 193: 
33:51. He explained that she drove a 1993 or 1994 champagne-silver Isuzu Trooper with 
tinted windows. R. 193: 34:02-34:14. He added that his ex-wife's vehicle was the only 
Trooper at the State Farm Office. R. 193: 34:45. After unsuccessfully trying to locate his 
ex-wife's office address in the phone book, defendant explained that her office was "right 
in front of Mediaplay on 1300 South." R. 193: 34:52. Defendant even attempted to call 
his ex-wife's office to verify the address, but could not get through. R. 193: 35:05. 
Defendant then described his ex-wife to Meza, writing down the information as he 
spoke. R. 193: 36:07-36:20. Defendant described her as a white female with curly brown 
hair, and blue eyes, standing five-foot six and weighing about 110 pounds with a small 
build. Id. Defendant expressed regret that he had not brought a picture of his ex-wife. R. 
193: 34:39. 
"This has got to be done" 
Defendant also explained to Meza that his ex-wife had a boyfriend, and that the 
boyfriend should also be assaulted if he was present at the time of the attack. R. 193: 
30:14, 36:59-37:55. However, defendant informed Meza that it would be easiest to catch 
his ex-wife alone. R. 193: 37:18-37:55. Defendant stated that "there's an address I can 
give the guy where he can go and beat her to death." Id. Defendant explained that the 
address was a small horse-barn in Orem that his ex-wife visited almost every day. Id. 
Defendant then decided that he would give all of the written information to Meza later 
9 
that night by slipping it through Meza's open car window. R. 193: 37:55. He told Meza 
to let him work on getting the information together and that he would provide it to Meza 
that night. R. 193: 37:39. 
Defendant then explained that he was "teetering on just turning [his ex-wife] into a 
vegetable instead of killing her." R. 193: 38:36. He emphasized, however, that "this has 
got to be done." R. 193: 39:08. He explained that his ex-wife "just about met her maker 
a couple of months ago" when he and a friend had planned to kill her and her boyfriend at 
Jackson Hole, Wyoming. R. 193: 39:23. Defendant indicated that he backed out of the 
plan at that time because he "felt a bad vibe/' Id. He also casually remarked as he 
answered his cellphone that "if it comes down to it, I ' l l . . . call you and tell you to keep 
the money and don't worry about doing it." R. 193: 40:09. 
Defendant closed the conversation by explaining his motivation. R. 193: 42:25. 
He stated that he was taking this action because he loved his children and was upset with 
the way his ex-wife cared for them and prevented him from seeing them. Id. 
"I'm serious about this. " 
In a final clarifying question Meza asked if defendant wanted the attack to happen 
in two weeks. R. 193: 43:19. Defendant nodded his approval. Id. He then added, "you 
can easily follow her. She's real predictable." R. 193: 43:33. He also encouraged Meza 
stating, "you cannot miss that Trooper." R. 193: 43:56. He then told Meza to give him a 
day to decide whether he wanted his ex-wife killed, or permanently incapacitated. R. 
193: 44:07. Finally, defendant clarified "I'm serious about this." R. 193: 44:59. As 
10 
defendant left the room, Meza remarked that "in two weeks she won't be your problem 
anymore " R 193: 45:50. "Okay amigo," replied defendant. Id. 
• . ' I hi prt hmuhii \> hetii m\; 
The above evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing. R. 194: 49. In 
addition, Greg Marcum, the father of defendant's ex-wife, testified that he had watched 
the - -dco oi Uk, uiotci meeting and that defendant had accurately descnbed his ex-wife, 
lief < i-hi I" .in1 'in liHin," ,1.) Ii..-.«. |l" !'»! 
Meza further testified that following the motel meeting, his understanding was that 
defendant wanted his ex-wife attacked In two weeks. R 194 ?? Although. Meza, and his 
' contact" were not to carry out the attack Jiiiriiiiirii 'ih.iidy, iney were going to conduct 
surveillance and then attack defendant's ex-wife in two \ - v 
the first $5,000. R. 194:34-35. 
Meza also testified that defendant never actually provided the written information 
HI .1 pliulogiapli HI! hi) i \ \y mi Hi1 ii". (lie I1*1* in Ill-id eailihri ajjieeil i, h u.k 
at the jail that night, defendant made a thi eatening gesture towards Meza by drawing : *s 
hand across his throat. R 194: 14- 15, Meza later awoke to find defendant standing o\ er 
his bunk R. 19 : I-: 15 : \fier Meza jm u: i iped out of bed, defendant stated, "you think yoi i 
j'ot awav with Ihi,1., ' -"on Hhln'l I'll I T ! " •*ui " Id. 
Sergeant Jerry Monson, who help e i : : nduct the video and audio surveillance of 
the motel meeting, testified that he believed defendant was suspicious about the 
t nntnulli'd meeting and was '" .iU IIIIIIL" iilllln mink I >illri flu mreliiii1 nil1' II IKMHOII lln 
officers waited for approximately thirty minutes before leaving the motel. R. 194: 50. As 
the officers left the motel parking lot, they observed defendant pull up in his truck. Id. 
Sergeant Monson later learned that defendant had returned to the motel and asked the 
clerk to speak with the officers upstairs, although he was told that there were no officers 
upstairs. R. 194: 46. Sergeant Monson also learned that defendant called his own 
cellphone from the motel lobby phone. R. 194: 51. Sergeant Monson believed that 
defendant then became even more suspicious because the number that appeared on 
defendant's cellphone when he called himself was different from the number that had 
appeared when Meza called earlier, although Meza told defendant that he had called from 
the lobby phone. Id. 
Sergeant Monson further testified that he interviewed defendant at the Utah 
County Jail and that defendant said that he was not sincere about having his ex-wife 
killed. R. 194: 52. Rather, defendant claimed that he was simply trying to set up Mr. 
Meza to get further information regarding the Mexican Mafia. R. 194:52-53.4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Because he pled no contest rather than proceeding to trial, defendant cannot 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of criminal solicitation. Rather, 
4
 There was also testimony at the preliminary hearing that Meza received $420.00 
and an early release in exchange for his cooperation with the police in this case. R. 
194:54. This evidence was inconsequential, however, because at a preliminary hearing 
"the magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence, or evaluate its credibility, but must 
leave those tasks to the fact-finder at trial." State v. Hester, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 159, f 7, 
3 P.3d 725 (quoting State v. Wells, 1999 UT 27,f 2, 977 P.2d 1192). 
12 
he may only challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the magistrate's 
bindover ordei v'V hen viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence 
supfioilnl .1 tr i mi .ill ill iu'lu'll thai illln ddnnlanl solieilol Mt.j/,i In kill in pcinunciil l1 
incapacitate his ex-wife, oi ai i ange with someone else to do so. Therefore, the magisti ate 
properly bound defendant over for trial 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROSECUTION PRESENTED S U F F I U I L > r] 
TO SUPPORT A REASONABLE BELIEF THAI 
DEFENDANT COMMITTED CRIMINAL SOLICITATION 
Although defendant frames his argument as a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
preserved is whether the evidence was sufficient to bind him over f r — -•• ya nf 
criminal solicitation to commit aggravated assault. Following the magistrate's denial of 
his motion to dismiss and subsequent order binding him over for trial, defendant entered 
to commit R. 156. He r e s e n t «*w n^hi iu challenge whether the 
evidence "is sufficient for a conviction on this charge." Id As he explained at his change 
oi plea hearing <u" \v going lu Liki tip on d\\\\\ .ill hcllici (lit fattii as presented in 
the preliminary hearing are sufficient to justify a conviction." R. 192: 10. 
At a preliminary hearing, however, the prosecution is not required to produce 
evidence sutti 'Mt to convict State v . - s *.3d 300. 
M « I T M \ IT I \ pi pcilv presn1 \ \ lu * *, 
13 
defendant was required to proceed to trial, and then to raise the sufficiency issue by 
proper motion or objection at trial. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ff 14-16, 10 P.3d 
346. Defendant did neither. Instead, he entered a conditional no contest plea. R. 155-
160, 192: 2-15. Thus, the issue is not whether the evidence was sufficient to convict. 
Rather, the issue is simply whether the evidence was sufficient to bind defendant over for 
trial on the charge to which he pled no contest - criminal solicitation to commit 
aggravated assault. R. 36, 152, 155-60. As demonstrated below, the evidence amply 
supported the magistrate's bindover order. 
A. The prosecution presented sufficient evidence of defendant's intent to 
have his wife killed or permanently incapacitated. 
In Clark, the Utah Supreme Court clarified the bindover standard. 2001 UT 9, f 
16, 20 P.3d 300. The Court concluded that at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution need 
only present "sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been 
committed and that the defendant committed it." Id. The court equated this standard to 
"the arrest warrant probable cause standard," and noted that "the quantum of evidence 
necessary to support a bindover is less than that necessary to survive a directed verdict 
motion." Id. In determining whether evidence at a preliminary hearing is sufficient to 
support a bindover, a magistrate must view all facts and reasonable inferences in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution. Id. at f 10. "When faced with conflicting evidence, 
the magistrate may not sift of weigh the evidence . . . but must leave those tasks to the 
fact finder at trial." Id. (quoting State v. Hester, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 159 f 7, 3 P.3d 
725). 
14 
•. A n individual commi t s cr iminal solicitation "if w ith the intent that a felony be 
commit ted , he solicits, requests, c o m m a n d s , offers to hire, or impor tunes another person 
to engage in spci itn HI Illlin I lli.il undci flu i in IILIISIJIH cs .is llitj aUoi In l ieu s Illinium In 
be w o u l d be a felony or wou ld cause the other person to be a par ty to the commiss ion of a 
felony." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-203(1) (1999), In addit ion, the solicitation must be 
" m a d e uncle nmstances s t rongly corroborat i ve of the actor' s intent that the offense be 
commit* ' ' * 4 - - ) ' ^ ( }\ 
Defe
 0 le evidence at the preliminary hearing did not support a 
reasonable belief that he committed criminal solicitation because the evidence was 
insuttkicui iouc:i. : . i , mat ne lr .. ne assault : n his ex-wife to actual!;; take 
place. Br. of Aplt. at; • •* * •*" "^ that during the nmtrolIM m<rtm|>, Mr 
mentioned that he mitzht Jet - H U M , , - "the whole thing off." Br. of Aplt. at 18. 
However, when viewed n. u t favorable to the prosecution, the evidence amply 
iiip|HiHi i reaMim iblr intended -.oMit'oni.1 In alLitk Inr.o, svilr mil 
completely incapacitate or even kill her. See Clark, 2001 UT 9 at ffl[ 10, 16, 20 P.3d 300. 
The prosecution presented evidence that defendant was enraged with his ex-wife 
because he belli ved she had tlicatcd mi him, had no! allowed him to see his children, and 
had.falsely accused him of several ci imes when he sought to sec his rhiMnm resulttno in 
his incarceration, R. 193: 42:32 - 45:00. Meza testified that defendant twice approached 
him at the jail and explained that he wanted his ex-wife billed. R. 194: 8. Defendant then 
15 
wife's name, an approximate home address, work address, a detailed description of her 
car, a description of her daily habits and instructions as to when and how he wanted the 
killing or at least the assault to take place. See Statement of Facts at 5-10, R. 88. 
Defendant's comment that he might change his mind about the attack was made in an 
offhanded manner as he answered his cellphone. R. 193: 40:07. Immediately after 
concluding his phone conversation, defendant reaffirmed his desire that the attack on his 
ex-wife occur in two weeks. R. 193: 43:19. He then encouraged Meza by stating that his 
ex-wife was predictable and easy to follow, and that her vehicle was also easy to identify. 
R. 193: 43:33-43:56. Finally, he confirmed his intent when he stated "I'm serious about 
this," and reemphasized the source of his anger with his ex-wife, specifically, the breakup 
of their marriage and her refusal to allow him to see his children. R. 193: 44:59. 
After viewing this evidence in its proper light, the magistrate correctly concluded 
that "[t]he videotape of the defendant [and] Mr. Meza in the motel room is strong 
corroborating evidence of the defendant's demeanor, and the sincerity of his request to 
have his [ex-]wife killed or maimed." R. 88. The magistrate also noted that intent is a 
question of fact best left to a jury. Id. As this Court observed in State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 
149, 152 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), "[t]here is rarely direct evidence of something as 
intangible as 'intent.' Intent is invariably a matter of inference to be drawn by the 
factfinder from all the evidence." Accordingly, the magistrate correctly concluded that 
the prosecution produced sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that defendant 
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intended that someone kill or at least assault and permanently incapacitate his ex-wife R 
SS;see ^*am. .. I. 
• -B. 1 he prosecution presented sufficient e idc iii ;: i • th at i i fc ud i int solicited 
Meza to engage in felonious conduct. 
Defendant also argues that there was no evidence of an "agreement to a concrete 
course of action int i n iing a specific result," Bi of Aplt. at 8, 18-19. 1 le contends that 
i 
information, and that he provided none of those things. Br. of Aplt. at 18. A~ also claims 
that rather than agreeing on a specific result, he and Meza discussed various ideas ranging 
from «i violent death, a disappearance, .m LIMSIIHII MI 'tilling the w hole thin^ oil '" ' ' 
Viewed in i In hi inim is! favorable to Ihr prosecution hovu'ifT Ihc evidence at the 
preliminary hearing amply supported a reasonable belief that defendant "solicit[ed], 
requested], offerfed] to hire, or importun[ed]" Meza to engage in specific, felonious 
Defendant twice approached Meza requesting that he, or someone he 'knew, kill or 
permanently incapacitate defendant's ex-wife, R M 12:25, 38:36-39:08, 44:59-45 50, 
194:8 Defendant and Meza discussed cl stailed payment arrangements 
12:5 4 Defendant si iggested^ rarioi is i i I stl I : Is for carrying out the attack, finally 
concluding that "it [can] be as sloppy as it wants to be, as long as it looks like a bad 
robbery " R. 193: 12:25-13:48,32:15 Defendant provided Meza with "his ex-w ife's 
i 
description of her daily habits, and instructions as to when and how he wanted the killing 
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to take place." R. 88, 193: 33:44-37:55. When Meza asked defendant whether he wanted 
the attack to take place in two weeks, defendant nodded his approval. R. 193: 43:19. 
Defendant made it clear that although he needed two weeks to surreptitiously obtain the 
first $5,000, he wanted the attack to take place at that time. R. 193: 10:15-10:38, 43:19. 
Although defendant discussed several methods of carrying out the attack, he made it clear 
that he either wanted his ex-wife killed or "turned into a vegetable." R. 193: 38:36. 
Defendant repeatedly stated that he was serious, and that the attack "[had] to be done." 
R. 193: 39:08, 44:59. As defendant left the motel room Meza remarked that "in two 
weeks she won't be your problem any more." R. 193:45:50. Defendant replied, "Okay . 
. amigo." Id. This evidence amply supports a reasonable belief that defendant committed 
criminal solicitation. 
Contrary to defendant's suggestion, the criminal solicitation statute does not 
require an agreement to act. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-203(1) (1999). The statute 
explicitly provides that "[i]t is not a defense under this section that the person solicited by 
the actor: (a) does not agree to act upon the solicitation." Id. at § 76-4-203(3)(a). Nor 
does the statute require that the person solicited by the actor commit an overt act, or even 
take a substantial step toward the commission of an offense. Id. at § 76-4-203(3)(b) & 
(c). Rather, all that is required is a solicitation, request, offer, or an importuning to 
commit a felony. Id. at § 76-4-203(1). 
That defendant did not provide Meza with money, a photo, or a key to his ex-
wife's vehicle was of little importance at the preliminary hearing. The fact remains that 
18 
the evidence , w h e n v iewed in the light mos t favorable to the prosecut ion, supported a 
reasonable belie""! llial defendant solicited JVleza to kill or permanent ly incapac 
wife, or .it least nrranpe with ii in ml In m 1 1 i ITierefore 11 n • iiMiMstMli pi< (ini", liiiund 
defendant over for trial. 
C The cases on which defendant relies are distinguishable. 
Each MI illm i ases upon " IIIH III Hi Icmldiil lelies are disting uishable because they 
analyze the sufficiency of the evidence following a conviction after a ji lrj trial, i i til i ;i 
than following a bindover order after a preliminary hearing. The cases are also 
distinguishable on their facts 
Dffnid.iiii i hmi'i 111.mi ini 'i ir luilti:ai \(hl i\i i M'MI ' miMm i i ipp i *K,S), 
the evidence was insufficient to bind him over on a charge of criminal 
solicitation Tr V Jazar, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for inciting 
anothei I iiimiiil inurdw. > •<* ornnn ,wv not support i finding that 
there wou ld have been a m r~»^efh .* , 
917-18 . I Inlike the Mi ,. „ . , .:>_• * e \ u , the L t a h c r i m i n a l ±u„dilution 
statute does not require p roof of imminen t action. See U T A H C O D E A N N . § 76-4-203( I ^ 
I l,»,'",M Rathei, .ill lli.il i-. re p u m l i\ lli.il III," idt i i t l . i i i l ' ' .nl int | |, i*:qiujs1| |, ..ninru.iiiJf |, 
offer[] to hire , or impor tune[] another to engage in specific conduct t h a t . . . would be a 
felony." Id. The statute explicit ly does not reqi tii 3 that the person solicited actually a.ei ee 
Ini LIL U uuiuiiiiiL tin u i u l act, oi even lake a substantial step toward the commiss ion of the 
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felony. Id. at § 76-4-203(3). Therefore, Salazar is not helpful in interpreting Utah's 
criminal solicitation statute. 
Salazar is factually distinguishable as well. In Salazar, the court also reversed on 
the ground that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant incited anyone. 
362 N.W.2d at 918. The court noted that it was actually the paid police informant who 
approached the defendant to participate in the crime. Id. In this case, however, it is 
undisputed that it was defendant who approached Meza and solicited him to find someone 
to murder or permanently incapacitate his ex-wife. R. 194: 8, 10, 12; 193:06:03. Indeed, 
defendant even states on the videotape that Meza can trust that he is serious about his 
plans because it was he who approached Meza. R. 193: 06:20-06:50. 
Defendant also relies on State v. Suggs, 453 S.E.2d 211,216 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995), 
in which the court vacated the defendant's conviction for solicitation to commit assault 
with a deadly weapon. The North Carolina court held that the crime of solicitation 
requires the prosecution to prove a request to perform every essential element of the 
crime. Id. at 215. The prosecution in Suggs failed, however, to present any evidence that 
a dangerous weapon was to be used in the solicited assault. Id. at 216. 
In contrast, the prosecution in this case presented uncontroverted evidence that the 
defendant requested the performance of every essential element of the crime of 
aggravated assault. "A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as 
defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: (a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-103(l)(a) (1999). Defendant solicited Meza to find 
20 
someone who would at least permanently incapacitate his ex-wife. See Statement of 
Facts at •-* .. Permanent incapacity ion w ould certainly amou" 
iniiirv111 iniflfi" fli111"1 •,ilL»|.i»i';ilvili(*.i,,I .iss.'inll '.l.ilul" I li • Irili4«"" Sm*y\, llit" prosecution in this 
case presented evidence of defendant's request to pei foi m each element of the crime for 
which he was convicted - solicitation to commit aggravated assault. 
Finally, the defendant relies on L • . . ... ) 
( 7th HI *|| 10Q4) 111 i inn-ill |||(. iiii | iTYPtM-u i c onvicuon of soliciting a violent teiony. in 
Rahman, an FBI agent approached the defendant and suggested that defendant hire him tc 
either kill or rob the victim. Id. When approached by the agent, however •* 
denied any desii ! z t :: I ::I11 the I :tim i ef ii ise dto agree tc an) \ • • - * 
and never affirmatively suggested that the agent commit any violent act against the 
victim. Id. 
In contrast, the prosecutv. i case presented clear evidence thai deiendanl 
app •• :d \ 
incapacitate his ex-wife. See Statement of Facts at 3 - . _ repeatedly 
stated that he was serious about his request, and even suggested methods for carrying out 
theattack, K I i \1 i . \ \ '" I i '('Ml, 11 i Il II i , H I / I M N . illlsi li 4 i i i L > u i A i d l l l i in 
i t s f a c t s 
Indeed, all of the cases upon which defendant relies turn on highly fact-sensitive 
inquiries. Defe ndanf s cases are distinguishable because the factual evidence that * as •. 
missing in (host1 cases is pirsnil in lliis i use Morrow n c n li ml defendant's c ises 
analyzed the sufficiency of the evidence to convict the defendants. The pertinent inquiry 
here, however, is simply whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to bind 
defendant over for trial. As demonstrated above, the prosecution did so. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons this Court should affirm defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this P day of September, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
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76-4-203. Criminal solicitation — Elements. 
(1) An actor commits criminal solicitation if with intent that a felony be 
committed, he solicits, requests, commands, offers to hire, or importunes 
another person to engage in specific conduct that under the circumstances as 
the actor believes them to be would be a felony or would cause the other person 
to be a party to the commission of a felony. 
(2) An actor may be convicted under this section only if the solicitation is 
made under circumstances strongly corroborative of the actor's intent that the 
offense be committed. 
(3) It is not a defense under this section that the person solicited by the 
actor: 
(a) does not agree to act upon the solicitation; 
(b) does not commit an overt act; 
(c) does not engage in conduct constituting a substantial step toward 
the commission of any offense; 
(d) is not criminally responsible for the felony solicited; 
(e) was acquitted, was not prosecuted or convicted, or was convicted of 
a different offense or of a different type or degree of offense; or 
(f) is immune from prosecution. 
(4) It is not a defense under this section that the actor: 
(a) belongs to a class of persons that by definition is legally incapable of 
committing the offense in an individual capacity; or 
(b) fails to communicate with the person he solicits to commit an 
offense, if the intent of the actor's conduct was to effect the communica-
tion. 
(5) Nothing in this section prevents an actor who otherwise solicits, re-
quests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an offense from being prosecuted and convicted as 
a party to the offense under Section 76-2-202 if the person solicited actually 
commits the offense. 
History: C. 1953, 76-4-203, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 189, § 1; 1993, ch. 230, § 1. 
76-4-204. Criminal solicitation — Penalties, 
Criminal solicitation to commit: 
(1) a capital felony is a first degree felony; 
(2) a first degree felony is a second degree felony; 
(3) a second degree felony is a third degree felony; and 
(4) a third degree felony is a class A misdemeanor 
History: C. 1953, 76-4-204, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 189, § 2. 
